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Many prevailing views contend that African politics are strongly influenced by
vertical networks of dyadic patronage relationships that have a damaging effect on
political systems, economies, and civil society. Since independence, the increasing size of
many African cabinets would, following the literature, indicate a growth in political
patronage networks. While these networks may increase the likelihood of leadership
survival, it is expected, ceteris paribus, that growing patronage coalitions would diminish
government revenue allocated toward the provision of public goods. This study goes
beyond previous research by quantitatively examining the relationship between cabinet
size and public goods provision that has been discussed only qualitatively thus far. A
time-series cross-sectional analysis utilizing data from 34 countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa from 1971-2007 suggests, contrary to previous studies, that increases in cabinet
size are associated with improved allocation of public goods in healthcare, education, and
infrastructure.
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1. Introduction
Political institutions structure the incentives that political leaders have to provide
good public policy.1 In the weak states that make up Sub-Saharan Africa, formal rationallegal political institutions are rarely fully consolidated and the resulting lack of leadership
restraint has created the incentive for leaders to promote policies that undermine the
wellbeing of society. Leaders in the region, such as Paul Biya in Cameroon, have
implemented clever strategies for staying in power, but have shown a relative lack of
creativity in promoting human development. This is reinforced by the relatively abysmal
performance on human development indicators such as life expectancy at birth, infant
mortality, and enrollment in secondary education across Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead of
providing an environment that promotes economic growth and human development
through the provision of important public goods, African leaders have often placed
greater focus on diverting public revenue to a select group of constituents.
While scholars have repeatedly focused on the ability of African governments to
appropriate public resources for private purposes,2 far less research has directly examined
their ability to redistribute public revenue in the form of public goods. By public goods,
this research refers to goods that are non-excludable and non-rival. This means that
public goods are those which, once consumed by individual A in group X, cannot be
withheld from other group members (Olson 1965, 14). Although few goods fully meet
Author’s note: I would like to express my gratitude to Alice Kang, Ross Miller, and to the other faculty
and graduate students at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln for their guidance in this research. Their
expertise and suggestions have been tremendously helpful. However, any errors in the following research
are my own.
1
See Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006), and Besley and Kudamatsu (2007).
2
Bates (1981; 2008) and van de Walle (2001).
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this criterion in reality, the concept of public goods provides theoretical contrast to
private goods, which are rival and excludable. Examples of public goods include
national healthcare programs, public education, and infrastructure such as roads and
sanitation services. Given the tremendous collective action problem that prevents these
goods from being adequately supplied by private individuals, governments are often
required to step in and provide these public goods which are vital to economic and human
development.3
The importance of public goods provision lies in the externalities associated with
it. Although the term originated in economics literature, it actually shares many
similarities to network theories in political science.4 Meade (1973) defines externalities as
“an event which confers an appreciable benefit (or inflicts appreciable damage) on some
person or persons which were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or
decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question (in Cornes and Sandler
1996, 39).” What this means in the context of African politics is that decisions to allocate
funds for public goods such as education or infrastructure have many unintended
consequences and benefits.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the scale of inequality in income makes public goods
provision incredibly important. Sierra Leone provides an excellent example given that
about 70% of its citizens live below the poverty line. As scholars have noted, weak public
goods provision disproportionately hurts the poor. 5 The free market allows wealthy
individuals in these societies to access resources like water, sanitation, healthcare,
3

See Olson (1965), Cornes and Sandler (1996), and Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).
See Putnam (1993) and Slaughter (2004) for examples of network externalities.
5
Besley and Ghatak (2006) and Ross (2006).
4
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transportation, and schools, but is inadequate for supplying these goods for those who are
most in need (Besley and Ghatak 2006, 285). Where these public goods are not
adequately supplied by the government the poor are effectively left out of formal market
activity. Hyden’s (1980, 10) study of peasants in Tanzania emphasizes the exclusion of
rural peasants from the cash economy. This exclusion not only hurts the poor and their
prospects of human development, but places a tremendous amount of negative
externalities on the society at large. Other countries such as Sierra Leone face incredible
barriers to developing a robust economy and civil society because of the overwhelming
majority who are living in poverty and are unable to participate in formal market activity.
The result of these barriers to the formal economy is that governments are unable to
generate adequate revenue to provide public goods, which are provided to citizens
through taxation and subsidies. Thus, understanding the role of patronage networks in
economic and human development in Sub-Saharan African is incredibly important to any
effort that seeks to change outcomes in the region.
The provision of public goods has generally been linked to regime type. Scholars
have noted the impact that democratic institutions have on promoting public goods and
the incentive structure that non-democratic regimes have to pursue private goods.6 Given
the greater levels of accountability that leaders have in democratic systems, it is expected
that they provide a wide variety of public goods. Conversely, autocratic leaders face few
institutional restraints. While democratic leaders are pursuing public goods to satisfy their
broad constituency, autocratic leaders prefer to appropriate public funds and distribute
them in the form of private goods to their salient political supporters. Autocratic
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governments are thus expected to provide a smaller proportion of public goods because
of an incentive structure that promotes bad policy. Since the wave of independence in the
1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced its fair share of bad policies implemented by
kleptocratic states.
However, this clear dichotomy between public goods providing democracies and
private goods providing autocracies has been complicated by the many arguments that
African politics are characterized by vertical patronage networks or neopatrimonial
regimes.7 Scholars have argued that African politics have been structured not by formal
rational-legal institutions, but by patronage networks that function through hierarchical
dyadic relationships between a single “big man” and his political support network. Van
de Walle (2001) has argued that even those African countries that are transitioning to
democratic systems are merely a façade behind which politics continue to be structured
through patronage networks.
While Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a wave of founding and second
multiparty elections between 1990 and 1994, with 54 elections in 29 countries, scholars
were initially very skeptical of democratic consolidation in the region (Bratton and van
de Walle 1997). Many transitioning countries in the region have failed to move beyond
anything but rigged elections run by corrupt regimes. As Diamond (2008, 38) notes,
“Many people in these countries—especially the poor—are thus citizens only in name
and have few meaningful channels of political participation.” Instead of participating
through the ballot box, some in Africa’s autocratic and transitioning countries are
7

See Lemarchand (1972), Lemarchand and Legg (1972), Theobald (1982), Jackson and Rosberg (1982),
Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 1997) and van de Walle (2001, 2003), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier
(2004).
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fortunate enough to be part of the ruling party’s patronage network. However, most are
left completely outside of the political sphere.
A more contemporary analysis by Lindberg (2006) provides caution to this overly
pessimistic view of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Instead of assuming that
transitions to democracy are complete or failed following one or two rounds of elections,
Lindberg shows that increasing the number of election cycles does help to consolidate
democracy. Taking Lindberg’s view of democratic development suggests that public
goods provision across Africa is likely to improve, although at a rate much slower than
many Africans would like. These contrasting views have thus exposed a puzzle that has
yet to be thoroughly examined in the literature on development in Africa.
This research will seek to evaluate the state of democratic consolidation in SubSaharan Africa through the proxy of public goods provision. First, a thorough review of
the literature on democracy, leadership survival, and patronage politics will be provided
to frame the empirical analysis. Second, a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) quantitative
analysis of 34 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1971 and 2007 will test the
relationship between cabinet size in African governments and public goods provision in
healthcare, education, and infrastructure.
Contrary to many influential studies in Africanist literature, the empirical analysis
here finds a substantively significant positive relationship between cabinet size and
public goods provision indicating that patronage networks may not be as pervasive as is
often thought. This suggests that the validity of existing theories explaining economic
catastrophe across Sub-Saharan Africa is questionable. Far from claiming that
kleptocratic regimes are a thing of the past in the region, these findings only suggest that
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African countries, even those with large cabinets, can break away from their
neopatrimonial past, assuming it was even systemic in the first place. The empirical tests
are followed by a discussion of the implications of these findings for policies aimed at
improving public goods provision, human development, and economic growth in the
region and for theory attempting to explain these phenomena. Although this research will
not provide a comprehensive guide to ameliorating Sub-Saharan Africa’s problems with
public goods provision, it does question the broadly negative view of patronage politics
and has important implications for aid and development programs.
1. Democratic accountability versus patronage politics
Theoretical literature on democratic political institutions has long stressed the
impact of increased levels of participation on public policy. Dahl’s (1971) classic
formulation of democracy offers a useful starting point. According to Dahl, democracy
can be measured in two dimensions by looking at levels of public contestation and
inclusiveness in the political process. Those countries that exhibit high levels of public
contestation and inclusiveness come closest to the ideal type democracy that Dahl coins
“polyarchy.” In systems that approach polyarchy, citizens become empowered to
formulate their preferences, inform political leaders of their preferences, and have their
preferences weighted equally with others in society (Dahl 1971, 2). In countries like
Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Liberia, and Nigeria where more than half the population lives
in poverty, the expression of citizen preferences are likely to reflect the desire for greater
public goods provision by the government. Indeed, the results of a 2008 Afrobarometer
survey indicate that roughly 3 out of 4 Nigerians believe the government’s economic
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policies hurt the majority of citizens and benefited only a select few.8 These attitudes are
congruent with the general “representation gap” that is perceived in most African
countries by citizens who believe elected officials are only concerned with selfenrichment (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 242).
The democratic model provided by scholars like Dahl has been extended to
specify the mechanisms through which citizen preferences are channeled. Barro (1973)
provides a model of citizen control over elected politicians that specifies the process of
politicians’ accommodation of citizen preferences for public goods. With the assumption
that politicians wish to stay in office, Barro shows that politicians must often adjust their
provision of public goods to satisfy citizen preferences and maximize their probability of
reelection. Although public goods are generally underprovided in the region, voters in all
countries lament that politicians only reach out to their constituents when seeking
reelection (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). However, this sentiment is not
limited to weakly democratic or neopatrimonial societies. Sub-Saharan Africa was
certainly not a region of flourishing democracies during the period under study here, but
this logic does provide reason to believe that politicians in Africa’s democratic systems
face a greater incentive to provide public goods.
While government representatives do not always wish to be reelected or are
institutionally restrained from doing so, the assumption is very powerful in explaining
greater public goods provision in democracies.9 Besley (2006, 104-5) discusses the three
main reasons why the motivation to stay in office is so powerful in shaping the behavior
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Afrobarometer. 2008. “Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Nigeria.” Question 11.
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of politicians. The first is that politicians may gain ‘ego rent’ from holding office.10
Second, politicians may wish to stay in office because government service provides a
platform for material gain. If arguments about neopatrimonialism and zero-sum politics
in Africa are correct,11 this should be a particularly strong motivator of political behavior.
Finally, there is a possibility that the reelection incentive comes from the strong
preference for providing public goods. This incentive may not be prevalent in Africa’s
more autocratic governments, but leaders and cabinet members in transitioning and
consolidated democracies such as Liberia and Botswana may be motivated to stay in
office based on this benevolent desire. Nevertheless, this final preference is expected to
be rare if Sub-Saharan Africa is indeed plagued by systemic neopatrimonialism.
Building off of the assumption that leaders wish to stay in office, Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) developed the selectorate theory of leadership survival. This theory
suggests that African governments with small winning coalitions have structural
incentives to engage in kleptocratic activity that takes public funds and uses them for the
provision of private goods among the winning coalition. Given that the theory assumes
that leaders are rational, the dominant strategy for autocrats is to distribute private goods
among their winning coalition in an amount sufficient to maintain coalition loyalty and
stay in office. However, as the winning coalition grows, the dominant strategy for staying
in office transitions to one of increasing expenditures on public goods which are able to
satisfy a broader coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 97).
Similar logic has been used by Africanist scholars before the formulation of
selectorate theory. Nicolas Van de Walle (2001, 105) argues that growing cabinet size is
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See Rogoff (1990).
See Kramer (1983), Bratton and Van de Walle (1994), Charap and Harm (2002), and Szeftel (2000a&b).
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one of several measures that show “the persistence of government consumption
privileging the higher levels of the political class with little benefit to the state’s
developmental functions.” What this is effectively stating in selectorate theory terms is
that true democratization, characterized by large winning coalitions, has not emerged in
Africa despite the increase in elections. Instead, even Africa’s “democratic” governments
maintain power through the assistance of small winning coalitions. If selectorate theory is
correct, this creates an institutional structure that promotes kleptocratic behavior among
the political elite.
Not only does Van de Walle suggest that the political elite are skimming public
resources, but also that maintaining offices for each ministry in Africa’s growing cabinets
is not cheap. Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa often have similar, and in many cases
larger, sized cabinets than many of the more developed countries. However, the gap in
GDP and government budgets between these countries is substantial. Thus, it is likely
that spending to maintain African ministries consumes a much higher as a percentage of
GDP than it does in the developed world.
A country where this large cabinet-small economy contradiction can be seen is
Cameroon. Its government has one of the largest cabinets in Africa with 44 ministers in
2000. However, its total economic output in terms of GDP converted for PPP was only
slightly higher than $23 billion. This is in comparison to a country like Romania which
has a population similar to that of Cameroon but maintains only 19 ministries. While
Romania has a cabinet size of less than half of Cameroon’s, its economy was over five
times the size in 2000 with a GDP converted to PPP of more than $116 billion.
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Not only are Cameroon’s many cabinet ministries expensive to maintain when
operating at peak efficiency, many have accused President Biya and his ruling CPDM
party of using cabinet seats to pay off the opposition. Since the return of multiparty
elections to Cameroon in 1992, its cabinet size has steadily increased. Instead of an
increase in cabinet size to better manage the country’s affairs, Takougang (2003) has
argued that Biya used the power of incumbency to manipulate the elections in his favor.
Along with exploiting the incumbency advantage, Takougang (2003, 428) states that:
President Biya and the CPDM have also continued to dominate the
political process through the effective use of patronage. Because the
regime maintains a monopoly over the nation’s purse strings, it has been
able to manipulate individuals, regions, ethnic groups, and even some
opposition parties in an effort to maintain control of Cameroon politics.
Just as regime loyalty by individuals, ethnic groups or region brought
tremendous financial and other socio-economic rewards under the oneparty system, the same remains true under the current political
environment.
This indicates that President Biya has distributed resources to several of the opposition
parties in exchange for their support; this is a clear example of government institutions
favoring bad policy for the exigent needs of leadership survival instead of policy intended
to benefit society as a whole. Biya was systematically allocating public funds for the
private purpose of staying in office. The difficulty of tracking the actual spending of
public funds through patronage networks is incredibly difficult; however, the fact that
important opposition members such as NUDP Vice President Hamandou Mustapha and
Secretary General Issa Tchiroma accepted cabinet positions after the elections in 1992
shows that cabinet seats play an important role in patronage politics and leadership
survival (Takougang 2003, 430-1).
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The case of Cameroon provides an ideal type for the tragedy of political economy
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some have related this tragedy of domestic politics to the tragedy
of international politics under the conditions of anarchy. Jackson and Rosberg (1982)
argue that in African politics as in international politics, the stakes for the incumbent
government are high and the governing institutions are weak. Given these structural
conditions, they argue that there is an incentive for selfish predatory behavior among
those in power. Leaders who do not exhibit these characteristics in this zero-sum
environment are not likely to survive. African politics is thus characterized by systems of
opportunistic patronage politics. Personal patronage systems are “a dynamic world of
political will and action that is ordered less by institutions than by personal authorities
and power; a world of stratagem and countermeasure, of action and reaction, but without
the assured mediation and regulation of effective political institutions (Jackson and
Rosberg 1982, 12).” Where societies are run by patrons or “big men,” the incentive to
provide good public policy is diminished and politicians become more interested in
strategically distributing private goods to their political supporters.
Other work has also stressed the unique political environment in Sub-Saharan
Africa and its path dependent implications. Although African governments have
undergone significant transitions to democracy from independence to present,12 Bratton
and Van de Walle (1994) suggest that Africa’s political development is conditioned by its
authoritarian past. They argue that “contemporary political changes are conditioned by
mechanisms of rule embedded in the ancien régime” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994,
454). This path dependence functions by subjecting democratic transitions to underlying
networks of dyadic patron-client relationships and informal rules that have structured
12

The mean polity score for the selected countries was -4.41 in 1971 compared to 2.41 in 2007.
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Figure 1. Mean Polity2 scores 1971-2007.
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African politics in the past. The result is that even in Africa’s transitioning countries, the
true power structures of government lie beyond the façade of rational legal bureaucratic
institutions of the modern state. In the neopatrimonial regime that lies underneath, “the
chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through
ideology or law” (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 458). These regimes influence the
societal norms of who can participate in politics and the amount of competition that is
allowed in the political process.
The salient finding from this literature is that the process of democratic transition
has been different in Africa than it has been in areas with corporatist regimes such as
Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe.13 The path dependence of
patronage politics in Africa is argued to have erected substantial barriers to political
participation and increased accountability that usually accompanies democratic

13
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transitions. In her study of women and politics in Senegal, Beck (2003) argues that
women lack access to important patronage networks and are thus disadvantaged in the
political process. She claims that there is a “hidden public” in Senegalese society that
“consists of patronage networks that permit social inequalities to be reproduced in
political institutions premised on equality and representation” (Beck 2003, 148).
Exclusion from the hidden public is associated with shorter tenure in office for women
and is likely inhibiting the descriptive representation of women in Senegal.14 This
suggests that politics in Senegal continue to be influenced by neopatrimonialism despite
being categorized as a democratic country according to the Polity IV database.15 It also
indicates that Sub-Saharan African countries like Senegal may provide an inadequate
supply of public goods because half of the population faces significant barriers to the
political participation. If women have difficulties participating in politics, politicians face
pressure from a smaller portion of society and will be less inclined to enact good public
policy that supplies sufficient public goods.
While this research questions the broad application of the literature on
neopatrimonialism throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, a lack of public goods exists
nonetheless. This lack of provision of public goods in areas of health, education, and
infrastructure creates economic problems region wide. Economists have long debated the
extent to which increasing these public goods produces positive externalities for the
economy as a whole, but have come to mixed conclusions. Many of the disputes have
centered on problems of endogeneity and have resulted in the widespread use of

14
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instrumental variables that have weakened previous findings.16 However, most of the
research on the externalities of human capital, particularly in education, is conducted
inside the U.S. or other highly developed countries because of the availability of data.
This provides reason to question the relative insignificance of human capital on economic
growth that has been found in previous studies.
Acemoglu (1996) provides a theoretical model that shows the increasing returns
from human capital accumulation. He argues that “Human capital externalities arise when
investment of an individual in his skills creates benefits for other agents in the economy”
(Acemoglu 1996, 779). This explains both the geographic concentration of certain
industries in places such as Silicon Valley and also the relative lack of investment in
locations throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan is thus a relatively unattractive
target for foreign direct investment (FDI) despite low wage levels because the region
lacks the human capital and the infrastructure to optimize profitability. Regions like East
Asia and the Pacific are thus better targets for FDI given their higher levels of human
capital. This suggests that greater investments in and improved delivery of public goods
could have serious benefits for human development and economic growth.
Other studies reinforce the importance of human capital and FDI by showing the
positive spillovers in research and development (R&D). Growth theory since Solow
(1957) has stressed the importance of technological innovation resulting from R&D as
the driver of long term economic growth. Wei and Liu (2006) show that R&D spillovers
from FDI in manufacturing have had a positive impact on the productivity of indigenous
Chinese firms. If Sub-Saharan Africa is ever able to reap similar benefits, increases in
16
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public goods are a necessity to increase the human capital and infrastructure necessary to
attract higher levels of FDI. Public goods provision will need to play an important role in
fostering an environment which encourages FDI and is thus incredibly important to the
overall economic situation facing Sub-Saharan Africa.
What selectorate theory suggests is that if the wave of democratization in Africa
has been substantively significant we should not find any systematic negative influence
of cabinet size on public goods provision. Africa’s transitioning countries should be
approaching Dahl’s ideal type polyarchy where citizen preferences for greater public
goods provision are taken more seriously, regardless of cabinet size. However, if the
wave of democratization in Africa is only masking the hidden patronage networks that
continue to be the locus of power in African society we would expect to find increasing
cabinet sizes to be correlated with decreases in the provision of public goods. Under
selectorate theory this would suggest that even democratic systems have de facto small
winning coalitions.
Moving beyond selectorate theory, this study tests previous arguments that
suggest Africa’s growing cabinets are increasing opportunities for kleptocratic behavior
by the state. A simple look at descriptive statistics shows that cabinet size in Sub-Saharan
Africa has grown from a mean of 16.34 members in 1971 to a mean of 26.76 members in
2007. If cabinet size is a reasonable proxy of patronage coalitions, literature on
neopatrimonialism suggests that such increases should expand the opportunities for
members of government to coopt public resources for private benefit. If cabinet members
are indeed a systematic cause of lower public goods provision, the growth of Africa’s
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cabinets will be yet another obstacle in the way of human and economic development in
Africa.
3. Research Methodology
3.1 Hypotheses
The extant research on patronage politics in Africa suggests that expansive
patronage networks should create an increase in private goods and a decrease in public
goods. Moving beyond previous studies of patronage in African societies, this study
disaggregates the relationship between patronage politics and public goods by selecting
several specific dependent variables. This approach increases theoretical specification
and methodological rigor that Lindberg (2006) claims are lacking in the neopatrimonial
literature. The lack of human development in Africa indicates that basic public goods
such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure are being poorly provided. This poor
provision of basic public goods not only places a burden on the economy by decreasing
the marginal product of investment in the private sector, but it also hinders human
development among the most vulnerable members of society. Therefore, this study will
test three hypotheses to explore the relationship between patronage networks and
outcomes in health, education, and infrastructure. The hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Increases in patronage coalition size increase the infant mortality rate.
H2: Increases in patronage coalition size decrease the average years of secondary
education.
H3: Increases in patronage coalition size decrease primary energy consumption.
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3.2 Data and Methodology
The dataset used in this analysis includes 34 Sub-Saharan African countries and
provides yearly observations from 1971 to 2007. Data on government cabinet size are
taken from Arriola’s (2009) analysis on cabinet size and leadership survival and is
extended by seven years to produce a more inclusive dataset. Taking the country-year as
the unit of analysis allows for testing the impact of yearly changes in cabinet size and
other control variables on specific public goods across 34 countries. The dataset includes
1181 country-years for the healthcare measure, 838 country-years for the education
measure, and 1151 country-years for the infrastructure measure to examine the
relationship between public goods and cabinet size.
All hypotheses are tested using a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) model
which utilizes panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs). TSCS models are useful for
datasets such as the one used here because of their ability to estimate the strength of
relationships across time and space. As Beck and Katz (1995) show, the panel corrected
standard error procedure produces more accurate standard error estimates compared to
other TSCS regression models, especially in comparative political economy research.
PCSEs allow for more accurate estimates of standard errors than standard feasible
generalized least squares (FGLS) models by accounting for heteroscedasticity among
panels. When PCSEs are coupled with lagged dependent variables, as they are here, the
twin problems of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are ameliorated. A pooled OLS
regression is also estimated for each model to perform regression diagnostics that are
unavailable using PCSEs.

18

3.3 Dependent Variables
It is important to note that these hypotheses all utilize dependent variables that are
based on outcomes, not government spending. There are two main reasons for this. First,
African governments are notoriously corrupt and have an incentive to misrepresent
spending on public goods for a variety of reasons. Second, even if we assume the data are
accurate, no systematic data are available on specific public goods spending. Also, purely
looking at spending does not get to the central question of this research. Africa’s citizens
do not just need more money spent on public goods; they need money spent in ways that
change outcomes. By specifically focusing on outcomes instead of spending, the
dependent variables used here help to assess the overall effectiveness of public policy.
The first dependent variable, infant mortality, measures infant mortality rate in
year y+1. Infant mortality provides a good proxy for public goods provision in healthcare
and sanitation and is lagged because of the expected delay in the impact of the
independent variables. Infant mortality rate is defined here as the number of infant deaths
per 1000 live births and is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators.
Kudamatsu (2006) has shown that democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa has improved
public service delivery in healthcare which has led to a decrease in infant mortality rates,
particularly among infants born to mothers of lower socioeconomic status. While the
impact of democratization may be beneficial, literature on neopatrimonialism suggests
that larger patronage networks might have a negative independent effect on infant
mortality rate.
The second dependent variable for public goods provision, secondary education,
measures the average years of secondary education for the total population aged 15 years
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or older and is lagged forward one year. These data are taken from the Barro-Lee (2011)
dataset which measures secondary education at five year intervals. Linear interpolation
was required to measure secondary education on a yearly basis and the variable was log
transformation to create a normal distribution that meets the assumptions of the
regression model. The skewness of the distribution here reflects the extremely low levels
of secondary education in the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries. Deacon (2009)
has shown that increases in democracy are associated with moderate increases in the
average years of secondary education and that the interaction effects between democracy
and income have a particularly strong impact on secondary education. Nevertheless, the
literature on patronage politics suggests that larger patronage coalitions should lead to
lower levels of secondary education.
The final dependent variable, primary energy consumption, is used as a proxy for
public goods provision in infrastructure. This variable is taken from the Correlates of War
National Military Capabilities dataset (v4.0) and measures energy consumption converted
into thousands of tons of coal (Singer 1987). This is not an ideal measure of public goods
provision in infrastructure, but does provide some indication of the availability of power
and the capacity of the state’s infrastructure to handle energy consumption. Other studies
have used finer measures such as the percentage of paved roads and the number of
telephones per worker (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), but the availability of
systemic data requires that inferences be made using the crude measure of energy
consumption. The importance of infrastructure development in promoting economic
development and foreign direct investment suggests that improving African infrastructure
is necessary to improve levels of development. Again, scholars such as Deacon (2009)
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have shown that increases in democracy are associated with increases in things such as
road density, but none, to my knowledge, have investigated the impact of patronage
networks on infrastructure development.
3.4 Independent Variables
The literature on public goods provision specifies a number of important
determinants; however, it overlooks the possibility that patronage networks are
redistributing public resources for private benefits. While no measure exists that can
perfectly capture the size of formal and informal patronage networks, several other
studies have used cabinet size as a proxy (Arriola 2009; LeVan and Assenov 2009; van
de Walle 2001). Data on cabinet size are taken from Arriola (2009) who measures the
number of individuals with cabinet minister status in each country-year and is expanded
to include cabinet size measures through 2007. The coding scheme used here does not
count deputy ministers, regional ministers, military councils, or similar high level posts
because of the inconsistent data across countries in the source.17
Cabinet size is a reasonable proxy because individual ministers are appointed by
the leader in both democratic and autocratic systems. Minister choice depends on a
variety of factors, but the literature on neopatrimonialism and leadership survival
suggests that cabinet ministers are chosen based on the leader’s affinity for them (Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003, 88). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 61) define affinity as
“simply a preference for one individual over another, independent of the policies of the
individuals.” Similarly, selectorate theory suggests that potential cabinet members desire
a place in government based on the amount of private goods a leader can supply them.

17

Data are taken from Europa Publications Limited (1972-2001). Africa South of the Sahara. New York:
Routlege. Additional research could expand the cabinet size measure to be more inclusive.
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The lack of public good provision in Sub-Saharan Africa means that individuals should
have a strong desire to gain a cabinet post because it is a way to gain public resources for
their own private benefits. 18
Although previous studies and selectorate theory suggest cabinet size is a useful
proxy for formal patronage coalitions, the measure does have certain drawbacks. First,
the cabinet size may not reflect the actual size of the patronage coalition. Cabinet
ministers may be at the head of very dense networks of informal patronage that have an
impact on public goods. Deputy Ministers, regional ministers, and military councils may
also hold important positions in formal patronage networks, but are excluded here
because of data availability issues. Furthermore, governments with small cabinets may
have vast patronage systems that are not captured by the cabinet size variable. Second,
there is a possibility that cabinet ministers are not the ones profiting from public
resources. Lower level government employees may be involved with kleptocratic
activities to a larger extent than cabinet ministers. Unfortunately, there is no complete
cross-national data available on lower level government corruption to test this possibility.
Several other important independent variables are included in the model to control
for alternative explanations of public goods provision. A variable that has received
significant attention in the public goods literature is Regime Type. Regime type is
measured using Polity2 scores from the Polity IV dataset. This variable codes
democracies on a scale from 0 to 10 and autocracies on a scale from 0 to -10. The higher
(lower) the Polity2 score is for a given country, the more democratic (autocratic) the

18

Additional research could examine the relationship between multi and single party cabinets and public
goods provision.
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country is. While Sub-Saharan Africa was characterized by relatively autocratic
governments in the early 1970s, the region has undergone a significant transformation to
more representative forms of government. This has certainly not lead to a region rife with
democracy; however, the mean polity score in the region has increased from

-4.41 in

1971 to 2.41 in 2007.
The vast majority of research on regime type and public goods allocation supports
the idea that public goods are better provided under democratic regimes (Baum and Lake
2001, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Besley and Kudamatsu 2006, Deacon 2009). While
there are differences between explanations for higher levels of public goods provision
under democratic regimes, most explanations highlight the incentives that government
officials have to promote good/bad public policy. As Lake and Baum (2001, 589) note,
all politicians have the “proximate goal of maximizing rents earned from the monopoly
power of the state…autocrats are unusual only in their ability to earn greater rents.” The
lower cost of political participation in democracies helps to promote citizen interests and
thus increases the public goods provided. The costs of leaving office are also much lower
in democracies so there is lesser incentive to earn rents from providing a lesser amount of
public goods. This interaction between political participation and leadership incentives is
thus expected to improve public goods provision.

Given the relative prevalence of

intrastate conflict throughout Africa, a control variable is also included for civil wars.19
The variable Civil War is a dichotomous variable which is coded 1 for every country year
where there was an ongoing civil war and 0 for country years in which there was no civil
war. The focus on human development through the provision of public goods necessitates

19

Out of 981 country years, 174 involved a civil war.

23

the inclusion of at least one variable of political instability. The destructiveness of civil
wars suggests that they should play an important role in public goods provision in areas
like healthcare, education, and infrastructure. Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) argue
that civil wars place a twin burden on society by destroying important human capital and
infrastructure and also diverting investment away from productive activity. This
diversion of resources from productive activity distorts government budgets and hinders
their ability to provide public goods (Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol 2003, 3).
Another important control variable that has been shown to have a significant
effect on public goods provision is GDP per capita. This variable, GDP per capita, is
taken from the Penn World Tables (7.0) and is measure in terms of purchasing power
parity (PPP) in millions of U.S. dollars (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2011). The impact
of GDP per capita on public goods is straightforward given the fact that public goods can
be financed through the direct taxation of society and/or through subsidies to private
spending (Roberts 1987). It should not be assumed that a higher GDP per capita
automatically leads to efficient spending and better outcomes in public goods provision;
however, previous studies show that economic size and income levels play an important
role in reducing infant mortality rates, increasing average years of secondary education,
and improving infrastructure. Thus, GDP per capita is expected to play an important role
in all models.
The relationship between economic aid and economic outcomes in Africa has also
received significant attention in the literature.20 The variable Official Development
Assistance, taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, measures net official
20

See Wolf (2007), Burnside and Dollar (2004; 2000), Dollar and Easterly (1999).
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development assistance (ODA) per capita in current U.S. dollars and is log transformed.
The research on the impact of aid on economic outcomes is decidedly mixed, however
there is a strong theoretical basis for including the variable in the model. As Collier and
Dollar (1999) argue, the efficiency of aid depends on the quality of government policy.
This leads them to claim that efficient aid allocation that focuses on countries with good
policy environments increase the number of individuals lifted from poverty each year
from 16 million to over 30 million. Burnside and Dollar (2000) provide further support
for this argument by finding that aid only has a significant effect on growth when it is
distributed in a good policy environment. Easterly (2003) conducts several robustness
checks on these findings with an updated dataset only to find weaker results.21
Quantitative squabbles aside, countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do receive a
tremendous amount of ODA. In 2010, Africa was the highest regional recipient of net
ODA at $47.9 billion which is over $10 billion more than the second largest recipient,
Asia (OECD 2012). While it is unlikely that Africa will see a twofold net ODA increase
that was pledged during the G-8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005, ODA will continue to
play a large role in financing African government budgets toward the pursuit of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As Wolf (2007, 651) states, “to reach these
MDGs improved service delivery in education and health as well as investment in water
and sanitation is needed.” Wolf is clear that spending alone cannot improve public goods
provision, but she claims that good institutional environments promote more efficient
spending to improve human development outcomes. The importance of aid to the
provision of public goods is thus an important control variable.

21

See Burnside and Dollar (2004) for a critique of Easterly (2003).
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Although sufficient data is not available to measure corruption over the period
under study here, an available measure that comes close to capturing the presence of
corruption is government consumption. The variable Government Consumption measures
the government expenditures as a percentage of GDP and is taken from the Penn World
Tables (7.0). Higher government consumption does not suggest corruption in and of
itself; however, if higher levels of government consumption are correlated with reduced
performance in public goods indicators the government is likely to be engaging in
kleptocratic activity.
The final control variable used is Openness to trade. This variable, Openness, is
taken from the Penn World Tables (7.0) and measures the total imports and exports as a
percentage of GDP. There is little research that directly addresses the relationship
between trade and public goods provision; however, there is a large body of literature that
relates trade to various economic outcomes. Although their results have been contested,
Frankel and Romer (1999) find that trade increases income when controlling for a variety
of other factors. Increases in income are likely to be associated with an increased revenue
base for government to finance public goods spending from. Not only that, but increasing
economic output is associated with better public goods provision in general. Trade can
also give governments an incentive to raise public goods provision to reduce the marginal
product of private investment thus making domestic industries more efficient and
competitive in global markets. This hypothesis is supported by Alcalá and Ciccone
(2004) who find that increased trade is significantly related to increased productivity
domestically. Conversely, Bates (1981) has shown that poor government trade policies
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have reduced trade and total output, particularly in African agriculture. Therefore,
controlling for trade is justified in analysis.
4. Findings
Each model provides consistent results with model fits (R2) of .43 to .48. While
this shows that the models leave a large portion of the variance unexplained, the models
are explaining a moderate amount of what determines public goods provision in the three
selected areas. Most independent variables yield results that are consistent with previous
research; however, cabinet size, the variable of particular importance in this study, is
found to be highly significant in the opposite direction that is expected from the body of
literature on neopatrimonialism. This is not to suggest that the literature on
neopatrimonialism is incorrect as these results may be stemming from cabinet size being
a poor proxy for patronage coalitions. Nevertheless, the divergent findings using cabinet
size as a proxy for patronage coalitions by prominent scholars such as van de Walle
(2001) and Arriola (2009) suggests that Lindberg (2006) is correct to criticize theories of
neopatrimonialism as being poorly specified.
4.1 Public Goods Provision in Healthcare
Previous research has emphasized the disastrous economic consequences of the
clientelist relationships that permeate African governments. Van de Walle (2001, 274)
argues that a select few government elite have been unable to move beyond their own
material interests and therefore have been unable to implement growth oriented policies.
While van de Walle is correct to note the problems that bad data pose to quantitative
analysis on the issue, recent use of cabinet size measures are sufficient to capture a
general relationship (Arriola 2009; LeVan and Assenov 2009). If a select group of senior
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government officials are pursuing their material interests at the expense of society across
Africa, we would expect that an increase in cabinet ministers would lead to a decrease in
the funds available for public goods in healthcare.
The results of the models indicate that van de Walle may be overstating his
claims. Cabinet size is found to be significant as a predictor of infant mortality rates, but
it takes the incorrect (negative) sign. Model 1 suggests that increasing the size of the
government cabinet by one minister decreases the infant mortality rate by roughly .3
infants per 1000 live births. Critics of quantitative studies in Africa are correct to point
out the lack of quality data and that using infant mortality rates as a proxy for public
goods provision certainly has its flaws (Ross 2006); however, the logic of neopatrimonial
arguments suggests that when there are more important individuals within government
that are seeking their own material interests, there should be more kleptocratic behavior.
The findings here suggest that larger patronage coalitions increase public goods provision
in healthcare or that cabinet size is not a good proxy for patronage coalitions.
All other control variables, save for Civil War and Official Development
Assistance, are statistically significant at or beyond the p < .01 level. As expected,
Regime Type plays an important role in predicting infant mortality rates which is assumed
here to be the result of democratic regimes increasing public goods provision in
healthcare. The results show that increasing the Polity2 score by one point decreases the
infant mortality rate by nearly 2 infants per 1,000 live births. This fits with existing
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theory on democracy and leadership survival that suggests increases in democracy allow
citizens to signal their preferences to government and have them taken seriously. 22
Of the four economic variables, three achieve significance in the model and take
the anticipated sign. The coefficients of the log transformed variables GDP per capita
and Government Consumption are slightly more difficult to interpret than the other. The
results indicate that a 10% increase in GDP per capita is associated with a decrease of
1.4 infant deaths per 1000 live births. The coefficient for Government Consumption
shows that a 5% increase leads to a decrease of 0.1 infant deaths per 1000 live births. The
final economic variable, Openness, shows that a 10% increase in openness as a
percentage of GDP results in a decrease in infant mortality of roughly 1.1 infants per
1000 live births. These results show the importance of looking beyond the statistical
significance of variables and determining their actual substantive significance in the real
world.23 Government Consumption, while significant at the p <.01 level, has a very small
substantive impact on reducing infant mortality. It also suggests that increased
government consumption, although it may be linked to corruption, does not have an
adverse effect on public goods provision in healthcare. The results for GDP per capita
and Openness have a larger substantive effect in the analysis as expected.
Finally, the Civil War variable is found to be statistically insignificant as a
predictor of infant mortality. This result is in contrast to earlier tests of the model using a
shorter time series (1971-2000) which revealed a large negatively signed coefficient that
indicates civil wars substantially reduce infant mortality rates. Nevertheless, the
22

Ross (2006) provides a critique of this result. However, this analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa supports the
orthodox conclusion in the political economy literature.
23
See Zilliak and McCloskey (2004).
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expanded dataset provides an increase in country-years which, although returning another
large negatively signed coefficient, finds that civil wars fail to be substantively important
in predicting infant mortality rates.
4.2 Public Goods Provision in Education
The result for the impact of cabinet size on public goods provision in education
also questions the hypothesis that larger cabinets should be associated with poorer
provision of public goods in education. In model 2, Cabinet Size is highly significant (p <
.001), but is positively signed indicating that larger cabinets tend to increase the average
years of secondary education for individuals 15 and older. The coefficients indicate that
increasing cabinet size by 1 minister increases the average years of secondary education
by nearly 2.1%. Therefore, adding 5 additional cabinet members is associated with a
roughly 10.5% increase in average years of secondary education. This is not a
tremendous impact given that the mean years of secondary education in the dataset is .84
years, but cabinet size is found to increase public goods provision in education
nonetheless. This creates greater suspicion that neopatrimonialism provides a general
explanation for what hinders the provision of public goods in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Ross (2006, 861) does provide reason to be suspicious of using secondary
schooling as a proxy for public goods provision by claiming that its use has led to
inconsistent results. However, he does make the case that infant mortality rates, along
with being a strong indicator of health services, are a reasonable indicator of the
educational attainment of women. If this is the case, the results from model one provides
reason to believe that the measure of cabinet influence in model two is robust. Again, this
questions important findings in the literature.
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Regime Type, as expected, also has a positive impact on public goods provision in
education. For every one unit increase on the Polity2 scale, average years of secondary
education are increased by 3.2%. This means that moving from a Polity2 score of 0 to 10
leads an increase in the average years of secondary education of 32%. These figures
match the theoretical expectations in the literature on democracy and leadership survival
and also fit well into the empirical literature on secondary education. Given the findings
of scholars like Ross (2006), however, this result should be treated cautiously. Perhaps
even more important to keep in mind is that the data on secondary education required
linear interpretation of measures taken every five years. The results of model two are thus
best judged in their relation to the findings in models 1 and 3.
The variable with the strongest effect on secondary education is Civil War which
indicates that an ongoing civil war increases the average years of secondary education by
14.6%. This is perhaps one of the unfortunate findings of this research as it likely
indicates a significant portion of the poorly educated are killed during civil war and thus
raising the average years of secondary education among those who survive. The result
indicates that, instead of advocating civil war to improve education, another proxy for
public goods in education must be found that is able to more closely test public goods
provision. A better proxy would require a variable that is not focused on the average
years of secondary education for the population over age 15 because of the impact that
civil wars have on the lesser educated in this category.
The analysis in model two shows that three out of four economic variables are
highly significant while Official Development Assistance has no significant effect. A 10%
increase in GDP per capita is shown to increase the secondary education measure by
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3.4%. Economic growth of this kind is certainly difficult, but there is little doubt
increasing GDP per capita will have a positive influence on public goods provision.
Interestingly, raising Government Consumption by 5% leads to a decrease in secondary
education of 1.3%. This supports the idea that corruption is widespread in African
governments by showing a specific public good that is being decreased by greater
government consumption. If funds were being used efficiently to improved education, the
sign on this variable is expected to be positive. Lastly, increasing Openness by 1% is
found to increase levels of secondary education by .9%. This effect may look small, but
countries with relatively closed economies could benefit greatly in education from
increasing openness to trade.
4.3 Public Goods Provision in Infrastructure
Previous research has found that corruption is endemic in the provision of public
goods in various infrastructure sectors, particularly in construction projects. As Bueno de
Mesquita et al. (2003) note, “The ease with which graft can be hidden in construction
projects makes this industrial activity unusually attractive as a way for leaders to indulge
in cronyism and nepotism.” While cross-national data on construction spending is not
available for Sub-Saharan Africa, the widely available measure of energy consumption in
thousands of tons of coal would be expected to be negatively influenced by
neopatrimonial politics. However, Cabinet Size is found to be highly significant and
positively signed in model 3 indicating that a one Minister increase in cabinet size leads
to a 7.1% increase in Primary Energy Consumption. While it would be foolish to roundly
reject the possibility that patronage coalitions do not have any effect on certain
infrastructure related public goods, the coefficient for Cabinet Size shows a strong
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positive effect on Primary Energy Consumption that further undermines the generality of
cabinet size arguments based on the literature on neopatrimonialism.
The first political variable, Regime Type, is shown to have a positive impact on
Primary Energy Consumption. Specifically, a one unit increase in the Polity2 score
increases Primary Energy Consumption by 1.2%. This variable should be treated with
some suspicion given that initial analysis using a time series from 1971 to 2000 indicated
a statistically significant but negative relationship between Regime Type and Primary
Energy Consumption. The other political variable, Civil War, does not achieve statistical
significance in the model.
As might be expected, all economic variables are significant in model 3; with
increased economic activity comes increased energy consumption. A 10% increase in
GDP per capita is estimated to increase energy consumption by 2.4%. Ironically,
increases in Official Development Assistance decrease Primary Energy Consumption. For
every $1 increase in ODA per capita, Primary Energy Consumption is decreased by .3%.
This effect is likely picking up on troubling situations that lead to increases in ODA and
thus may not be reflecting the independent contribution of ODA itself. Consistent with
the literature suggesting that infrastructure projects are rife with corruption, increasing
Government Consumption by 5% decreases energy consumption by nearly 5%. This
suggests that corrupt activity is indeed taking place in public goods related to
infrastructure. Reducing this corrupt activity is thus tremendously important to improving
access to energy for all members of society.
The negative coefficient on the final economic variable, Openness, seems
counter-intuitive. One might expect that a country that was very open to international
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trade would have a more robust export sector that would generate the foreign exchange
necessary to import a high volume of products. However, the results in model 3 show that
a 1% increase in Openness leads to a 1.7% decrease in Primary Energy Consumption.
The results are likely being driven by the weak economies in Sub-Saharan Africa that are
heavily reliant on imported goods while remaining relatively underdeveloped in their
own export sectors. Further research is needed adequately explain this result.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The use of PCSEs and lagged dependent variables corrects for the two most
common problems in TSCS research, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Beck and
Katz (1995) have made a strong case for this procedure, but conducting diagnostic checks
using PCSEs is rather difficult because of the limited options available in STATA.
Therefore, after running each model with PCSEs, each model was run again using a
straightforward pooled OLS regression. This procedure returns substantive results that
are identical to those found using PCSEs, only standard errors differ slightly between
models.
Using pooled OLS regression creates the capability to examine residual plots for
influential observations. Examining the plots and DFBetas showed that there were two
potential country-year outliers in the partial plots (Congo 2005 and Zambia 1995) for the
Official Development Assistance Variable. Two dummy variables were created to control
for these potentially influential cases, but the results in the amended model remained
substantively the same. Therefore, the dummy variables were dropped and the original
models were left unchanged.
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5. Conclusion
Are Africa’s burgeoning cabinets reducing the resources available to provide
public goods? While many have argued that the increasing number of cabinet ministers in
African governments are a troubling sign of patron-client relationships that have a
pernicious effect on society, it appears that this phenomenon is actually increasing human
development in the region. Rather than being a widespread source of corruption and
instability, this research shows that patronage politics can actually constitute stability and
progress in a difficult political environment. It is important to remember that, to a certain
extent, patronage politics occurs in every political system. Although Western observers
may be appalled by the by the patronage tactics of African leaders, looking at the societal
impact of these networks provides reason to caution against a wholly antagonistic
outlook. Patronage networks can, indeed, be a source of progress.
The findings here emphasize the point made by Lindberg (2006, 4) that the
literature on neopatrimonialism suffers from a lack of “theoretical specification,
methodological rigor, and, perhaps most of all, insufficient collection of data suitable for
comparative analysis.” Theoretically, scholars have often dismissed the potentially
beneficial impact that patronage politics have on society, particularly in political
environments like Sub-Saharan Africa. By assembling a large original dataset for the
region and using a rigorous methodological approach, this study exposes empirical
regularities that will aid in the building of a more useful theory of neopatrimonial rule in
Africa. This study also reinforces the need to disaggregate analyses of neopatrimonial
rule to gain a more detailed picture of its impacts in a variety of areas. The results
presented here can certainly be challenged because of the lack of quality data; however,
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governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations rely on
much of the same data used here to design policies that have a real world impact. Even
though the data is often poor, scholars must not shy away from using the information
available to them.
What the information used in the time-series cross-sectional analysis shows is that
increases in cabinet size have a statistically significant and substantively important real
world impact on the provision of public goods in healthcare, education, and infrastructure
across Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis also shows that general theories of public goods
provision are correct to claim that increases in democracy are associated with the better
provision of public goods in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa’s democratic regimes,
particularly with healthcare and education, do have higher levels of effective public
service delivery. Also consistent with previous findings, economic development is
incredibly important for improving public goods provision. Improving GDP per capita
increases the tax base that provides national healthcare, education, and infrastructure.
However, increasing government spending in these areas is not enough. This
disaggregated analysis shows that increases in government consumption have negative
effects on education and energy usage. Nevertheless, further research needs to be done to
examine this relationship thoroughly.
As scholars of Asian and Latin American politics have noticed, patronage politics
is not necessarily damaging to economic and human development. This study of SubSaharan Africa reaches the same conclusion and provides a microstructure for a better
general theory of neopatrimonial rule. Beyond a merely academic endeavor, this research
has the ability to influence the ways in which outside actors provide development
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assistance to the region. Far from being the cause of Africa’s political and economic
problems, large cabinets can actually be beneficial. This provides reason to be weary of
calls to reduce the size of government in exchange for development funds. While there
are certainly many institutional factors at play in the region’s dismal provision of public
goods, the results here indicate that large cabinets can actually benefit society.
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Appendix A
Independent Variables

Infant
Mortality

Secondary
Education

Energy
Usage

Cabinet Size

.29**
(.08)

.02***
(.002)

.06***
(.007)

Regime Type

1.91***
(.21)

.03***
(.002)

.01*
(.005)

-2.39
(1.75)

.13*
(.05)

.08
(.11)

14.62***
(.99)

.34***
(.02)

.24***
(.03)

-.0002
(.02)

.0002
(.0006)

-.002*
(.001)

2.46**
(.71)

.25***
(.03)

.83***
(.04)

.11***
(.03)

.009***
(.21)

.01***
(.02)

207.1***
(6.68)

3.11***
(.21)

207.19***
(6.74)

.4406

.4801

.4325

34

24

34

1181

838

1151

Civil War

Log GDP per capita

Official Development Assistance
(per capita)
Log Government Consumption
(% of GDP)

Openness

Constant
R2
States
N

Pooled cross sectional time series
Figures listed are coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001. STATA 9 was used to generate results.
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Appendix B
Correlation Matrix
| cabinet polity2 civwar logcgdp odapc logcgov openc
---------------------------------------------------------------------------cabinet | 1.0000
polity2 | -0.0643 1.0000
civwar | 0.0955 -0.0202 1.0000
logcgdp | 0.2260 0.3042 -0.1849 1.0000
odapc | 0.0242 0.1568 -0.1094 0.3340 1.0000
logcgov | -0.1940 -0.0568 0.1814 -0.1388 0.0855 1.0000
openc | -0.1177 0.2555 -0.2656 0.4356 0.3707 0.0060 1.0000
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Appendix C
Countries in the dataset
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Central African Republic
Cote d’Ivoire
Cameroon
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guinea
Kenya
Liberia
Mauritania

Madagascar
Mali
Mauritius
Malawi
Nigeria
Niger
Rwanda
Sudan
Senegal
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanzania
Chad
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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